REMARKS OF
ANNE TIERNEY GOLDSTEIN*
I was very pleased to be asked to be on this particular panel,
because I think the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Civil and Political Covenant) too often is overlooked by
people interested in women's international human rights. In fact, I
believe that the Civil and Political Covenant is the treaty that provides
some of the most powerful tools for attacking sex discrimination. It
is in many ways even more powerful than the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Women's
Convention), because the Women's Convention was drafted by people
thinking about women and ratified by States that were thinking about
women, and the States, therefore, wrote reservations to prevent the
Women's Convention from having too much impact. The strength of
the Civil and Political Covenant, like the strength of the American
Convention, is that it has not only a clause under which States
promise to not discriminate with regard to the covenant itself but has
a freestanding equal protection clause. A country that ratifies the
covenant, which many countries did without thinking about women,
promises not to discriminate on the basis of sex in any of its laws.
The Women's Convention is important because of its specificity and
because the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) has so much expertise. But in a sense, the
Women's Convention is also redundant. If a country has ratified the
Civil and Political Covenant, it has promised not to discriminate
against women, and anything that would be banned as discrimination
against women under the Women's Convention would also be banned
under the Civil Covenant.
The Covenant and the Women's Convention are said to differ, in
part, because of the public/private distinction that we have been
hearing so much about. The Women's Convention purports to reach
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private conduct; it gives States a duty to shape private conduct. The
Covenant is supposed to be about only public action.
In fact, this public/private distinction is largely illusory. Professor
Susan Ross of Georgetown has suggested that whenever you see the
word "public," substitute the word "important," and whenever you see
the word, "private," substitute the word, "unimportant." What one
country or what one era sees as public, another will see as private, and
vice versa. The public/private distinction is no more-and no
less-than a male judgment of what is important enough to try to fix.
Think about the public/private distinction in the context of the
history of our own country. Why is it that lynching was recognized as
public nearly 100 years before domestic violence was, when both
lynching and domestic violence are perpetrated by private individuals?
At least in theory, conventional criminal assault and murder provisions could have been invoked against both lynch mobs and batterers.
Yet the need for specific provisions to deal with lynching was
acknowledged (in the form of federal civil rights legislation) long
before domestic violence legislation was enacted by any legislature.
Now think about the public/private distinction in the context of
international law. Disappearances have been considered a violation
of international law for a good twenty years, even though they are
often perpetrated by private actors. Yet it is only in the past five years
or so that human rights groups and academics have begun to
conceptualize domestic violence as a human rights issue. The
Women's Convention does not even mention domestic violence
(although the CEDAW has interpreted provisions of the treaty to
encompass violence against women as a form of discrimination).
Even if one were to accept the public/private distinction as a
meaningful one, however, it is far from clear that the Women's
Convention reaches "private" conduct and the Civil and Political
Covenant does not. Under Article 2 of the Covenant, States bind
themselves "to respect and to ensurd' to individuals within their
territories the rights recognized in the treaty. Under Article 6 they
guarantee that the "inherent right to life... shall be protected by law."
Article 8 bans all forms of slavery and the slave trade, not merely
government trafficking in human beings. Article 17 not only
proscribes "arbitrary or unlawful interference with [] privacy, family,
home or correspondence [and] unlawful attacks on [] honour and
reputation," but also grants individuals "the right to the protection of the
law againstsuch interference or attacks." Nothing in the Covenant
limits the responsibilities of member States to matters that can be
characterized as taking place within a "public" sphere.

1995]

REMARKs OF GOLDSTEn1

1317

Finally, even if it were true that the Covenant only imposed
negative duties on member States (i.e., that it only required States to
refrain from affirmative acts of discrimination, and did not require
States to take any positive action), the Covenant still provides women
with powerful tools in the area of reproductive rights, because in most
countries this is a field that is riddled with state action. There is no
need to resort to elaborate theories of state accountability for
nonaction. For example, if a State has a law that requires a woman
to have her husband's consent before she can get birth control, that
is state action. If she needs her husband's consent for an abortion,
that is state action. State action cannot make an act, such as abortion,
legal but discriminate on the basis of gender as to who can decide to
perform that act.
If a State has a law that places a higher value on female chastity
than on male chastity, that is state action. Several countries in the
world still have laws that decriminalize or even legalize abortion to
save a woman's honor-sometimes worded in terms of a male
defendant saving his wife or daughter's honor.
Well, what does that mean? That kind of law is, itself, a form of
active, and not merely tolerated, discrimination by the State. There
is no state action problem if a State authorizes abortion in cases of
rape but then defines marital rape as noncriminal.
Like Sarah Lal,' I feel a little undressed, because I have been
working on this metaphor all morning of a spider's web and I am not
sure I have it quite right. Discrimination in every country of the
world consists of a web of lies. I have been trying to figure out what
the spider is that is hiding in the center, and I think it is something
called patriarchy; it is the male reluctance to give up power. If you
go for the spider first, you are going to lose; it will bite. If you go for
the web, on the other hand, you can at least expose the spider to
everybody. You can at least show what is going on, and you can begin
to unravel the system that supports the spider. Eventually, if you
unravel enough of the web, the spider will either have to die or at
least become a vegetarian.
To be more specific, I would like to take the case of Nigerian child
marriage that Sarah Lai is working on. She points to the problems of
applying international law norms. Is child marriage inherently
violative of international human rights standards? Take a case where
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a young girl agrees to marry for economic reasons or in order not to
shame her family in a culture that understands marriage to be the
union of two families. Have her rights been violated? If so, which
ones? If she is of marriageable age, she has an internationally
recognized right to marry.
The problem is, as Sarah's remarks demonstrate, that human rights
treaties provide little guidance on what constitutes marriageable age.
Although the Women's Convention has a provision that deals
specifically with child marriage, Article 16(2), that provision leaves
States free to set any minimum age of marriage they want. In other
words, you will always get into trouble if you go for the spider first.
If you go for something based on documents drafted with women in
mind, it will be hard to win.
On the other hand, if you take the Civil and Political Covenant and

Nigerian law itself, you have a slam-dunk case, because under
Nigerian criminal law, Article 282 of the penal code, it is rape to have
sex with a girl under fourteen. A girl under fourteen is too young to
consent to rape under Nigerian law, unless she is your spouse,
because marital rape is legal under Nigerian law. Therefore, you have

a situation in which the State of Nigeria has passed a law saying that
females, but not males, forfeit their rights to the protection of the
criminal law on marrying. That is sex discrimination, which violates
not only the Civil and Political Covenant, but the Constitution of
Nigeria.
If you focus on the documents that were not written with women
specifically in mind, you will almost always win. That is why the Civil
and Political Covenant is such an exciting and potentially useful tool
in this area.

